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Are Two Knaves Better
Than One? Hume, Buchanan,
and Musgrave on Economics
and Government
Andrew Farrant and Maria Pia Paganelli
You must only take care to remove all the vices. If you remove part, you
may render the matter worse. . . . For whatever may be the consequence
of such a miraculous transformation of mankind, as would endow them
with every species of virtue, and free them from every species of vice;
this concerns not the magistrate, who aims only at possibilities. He
cannot cure every vice by substituting a virtue in its place. Very often he
can only cure one vice by another; and in that case, he ought to prefer
what is least pernicious to society.
—David Hume, “Of Refinement in the Arts” (1752)
We may think of a problem in at least two ways. We may ask what the
best-possible scenario is, or we may ask what the worst-possible sce-
nario is. We may therefore base our theories on the best-possible assump-
tions or on the worst-possible assumptions. Thinking in terms of the for-
mer is generally considered best-case theorizing. Thinking in terms of
the latter is generally considered worst-case theorizing.
Worst-case theorizing about government has a long and distinguished
history in political economy (Levy 2002; Toma and Toma 1984).1 David
The authors thank the participants at the 2004 HOPE conference, the 2004 History of Eco-
nomics Society meeting, and the 2004 Summer Institute for the Preservation of the History
of Economics, as well as David M. Levy, Tyler Cowen, Doug Den Uyl, Jerry Evensky, Mark
Yellin, and HOPE’s reader for useful comments and discussion. All remaining mistakes are
ours.
1. Toma and Toma (1984, 93) note, “[The] Leviathan assumption appears to be at the heart
of the classical conception of constitutional government.” Brennan and Buchanan ([1980]
2000, 220) acknowledge that their Leviathan model of government marks a return to “the
[worst-case] spirit of the classical liberal political economists.” James Mill’s 1820 model of
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Hume provides the classic statement of worst-case thinking in political
economy: “Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in con-
triving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and con-
trouls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a knave, and to
have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest” ([1742] 1985a,
42–43). Hume models public choosers as self-interested knaves pursu-
ing their private interests, rather than as angelic public-spirited creatures
(best case).
Reference to Hume’s worst-case model of government is common-
place in the contemporary constitutional political economy literature
(see, e.g., Brennan and Buchanan [1985] 2000; Sutter 1998; Faria 1999).
James M. Buchanan—a founding father of that literature—is consid-
ered responsible for the revival of worst-case thinking about government
in modern political economy (Levy 2002).2 Buchanan argues that one
ought to model both the private chooser and the public chooser symmet-
rically (see, e.g., Buchanan 1987, 85, 89–90; Buchanan and Musgrave
2001, 127). If private interest is pervasive in private choice, then it is
also likely to prove pervasive in public choice. What generates market
failure in one context will similarly generate government failure in the
other (Buchanan and Musgrave 2001, 126–27).3
In stark contrast, however, Richard Musgrave (1997, 156) models pri-
vate and public chooser asymmetrically. Private choosers are akin to
Hume’s knaves, whereas public choosers, by contrast, are rather more
akin to public-spirited angels (Buchanan and Musgrave 2001, 82).
In this essay, we argue that Buchanan’s analysis of government has
more in common with that of Musgrave than it does with that of Hume.
Despite the proclivity in the constitutional political economy literature
to point to Hume as an inspiration for modern-day worst-case theoriz-
ing, we suggest that modern constitutional political economy is another
example of best-case thinking; its analysis ultimately relies on angelic
government as slave driver writ large is remarkably similar to the Leviathan model of govern-
ment provided by Brennan and Buchanan in the late 1970s. Indeed, the suggestion that one
should model government as slave driver was not unique to Mill: “Every Monarch is a Slave-
holder upon the largest scale” (Bentham [1822] 1989, 171). Toma and Toma (1984, 93) suggest
that the Brennan-Buchanan Leviathan model “seems to apply naturally to a monarchial form
of government.”
2. “If the purpose is one of drawing the constitutional limits on the taxing power, would
it not be meaningful to utilize a worst-case scenario and to see model governments, anywhere
and everywhere, as revenue-maximizing? That is, given any revenue source, would it not be
best to assume maximal exploitation?” (Buchanan 1992, 105).
3. “The economist who utilizes homo economicus, who can identify market failure . . . is
under an obligation to identify government or political failure” (Buchanan 1979, 77).
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behavior—even if on a rather different level than that of Musgrave.
Hume instead is consistent in his worst-case theorizing about govern-
ment, thinking that the only feasible solution to political knavery is yet
more knavery.
Whether contemporary political economy is an example of best-case
or worst-case modeling is relevant because the performance of a model
depends on whether its underlying suppositions hold in reality or not. If
the rules of the game governing both private (market) and public (gov-
ernment) choice alike are structured in accordance with the assumption
that all men are knaves, and if men are indeed knaves, nobody is worse
off. If men are angels, the institutional arrangements will either simply
prove unnecessary (assuming they are not binding) or, if binding, will
generate some loss in efficiency. Similarly, if institutions are designed in
accordance with the supposition that men are angels, and if that suppo-
sition proves accurate, the first-best outcome will result. But if all men
are knaves, large suboptimality will surely reign.
The essay is organized as follows: in section 1 we review Hume’s
worst-case model of government. For Hume, knavery (private interest)
checks knavery in the context of public choices. We suggest that one
ought to read Hume as providing a second-best-type argument. The first-
best outcome, the wholesale elimination of knavery is, Hume argues, ut-
terly unattainable. Knavery is simply part of the backdrop provided by
human nature. Thus the partial elimination of knavery is likely to make
matters far worse, as the partial removal of knavery only weakens any
existing checks against whatever knavery still remains. As Hume puts
it in a slightly different context—two vices are better than one, in that
each tempers the ill effects resulting from the other. Section 2 describes
the Buchanan-Musgrave debate. Buchanan argues that knavery checks
knavery within a private choice scenario typified by high-quality rules of
the game (e.g., the logic of entry and exit within a competitive market,
and the rule of law and security of property rights). The knavery of pub-
lic choosers is constrained by high-quality rules of the game as well (e.g.,
constitutional rules). On the other hand, Musgrave relies on angelic gov-
ernment agents to check the excesses of private-choosing knaves, thereby
correcting for market failure and the like. Musgrave requires no constitu-
tional checks on the said angels’ uses of discretionary power: as angels
are not knaves, in the realm of public choice there is no need for any
checks. Thus Musgrave’s view suggests that first-best efficiency obtains
in both the private- and public-choosing spheres. The antidote to private-
choosing knavery is angelic public spirit. In section 3 we claim that
74 Andrew Farrant and Maria Pia Paganelli
Buchanan implicitly sidesteps the question of how knavery is checked
within a public choice context. He sides with Musgrave on “the con-
stitution based on public spirit” side of the barricade. Buchanan argues
for constitutional constraints to check the knavery of public choosers,
thus implicitly abandoning the assumption of motivational symmetry at
the constitutional level—and we argue—thereby supposing angels both
write and enforce the constitutional rules of the game. In this respect
Buchanan differs from Hume. Hume relies exclusively on knavery even
at the constitutional level. The example of a successful constitution that
Hume provides is the British constitution, a constitution that no angel
wrote, but which emerged from centuries and centuries of knavery clash-
ing against knavery.
1. Hume’s Second-Best Theory of
Constitutional Equilibrium
David Hume, like the modern constitutional political economist, argues
for the fixity of agent-type.4 Knavery and pervasive self-interest are de-
scriptive of humanity’s “present depraved state” (Hume [1742] 1985a,
609). Private interest is, for Hume ([1742] 1985b, 38), a “great weak-
ness,” but a weakness that is “incurable in human nature.” Hume ([1742]
1985a, 42) argues that “in contriving any system of government and fix-
ing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought
to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than
private interest.”5 Plans of government that assume otherwise or that
4. Hume ([1772] 1999, 150): “There is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all
nations and ages, and that human nature remains still the same, in its principles and operations.
The same motives always produce the same actions: the same events follow from the same
causes. . . . Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and
Romans? Study well the temper and actions of the French and English. . . . Mankind are so
much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in
this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human
nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with
materials from which we may form our observations, and become acquainted with the regular
springs of human action and behavior.” On constitutional equilibrium, William Paley ([1785]
2002, 337) writes, “This security is sometimes called the balance of the constitution: and the
political equilibrium, which this phrase denotes, consists in two contrivances—a balance of
power, and a balance of interest.”
5. While Hume does not deny human benevolence, he does stress that it weakens with social
distance. As society increases in size and complexity, such benevolence becomes increasingly
attenuated: “Men being naturally selfish, or endow’d only with a confin’d generosity, they are
not easily induc’d to perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some
reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a performance” (Hume
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suppose any “great reformation in the manners of mankind, are plainly
imaginary. Of this nature, are the Republic of PLATO, and the Utopia of
Sir THOMAS MORE” ([1752] 1985a, 514).
Given the inadequacy of modeling with any supposition of dramat-
ically changed agent-type or angelic-type men (514), Hume proposes
to use institutions (or rules) to align private interest with public inter-
est. Good rules of the game serve to induce even those agents who are
“knaves” to act such as to further the public good. Indeed, “republican
and free government would be an obvious absurdity, if the particular
checks and controuls, provided by the constitution, had really no influ-
ence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the public
good” ([1742] 1985c, 15–16; see also 24).
Thus it is by private “interest [that] we must govern him [man], and,
by means of it, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and am-
bition, cooperate to public good. Without this, say they [political writ-
ers], we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and
shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or pos-
sessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall have no se-
curity at all” ([1742] 1985a, 42). Elsewhere, Hume ([1742] 1985c, 15)
laments that were it otherwise, were rules an inadequate substitute for
agent-type, he “should be sorry to think, that human affairs admit of no
greater stability, than what they receive from the casual humours and
characters of particular men.”
Assuming knavery in both private- and public-choosing spheres im-
plies that in both spheres the “allurement of present, though often very
frivolous temptations” ([1742] 1985b, 38)—namely, what Buchanan
calls the lure of the “off-diagonal” in any canonical prisoner’s dilemma
(PD) scenario (see Buchanan and Congleton 2003, 35–54)—will induce
pervasive suboptimality whenever individuals interact within a poor-
quality incentive structure.
Immediately on having stated the maxim that one ought to model po-
litical agents as if they were knaves, Hume ([1742] 1985a, 43) suggests
1978, 519; emphasis added; see also Yellin 2002, 378–79). While suggesting that benevolence
reigns within the family, thus explaining why property is held in common within the family,
Hume argues that any theory of government resting on an idealized assumption of benevolent
public officials is “plainly imaginary” (514). On benevolence and Hume’s theory of property,
see Levy 1992, 92–106. On Hume and benevolence, see Marciano, this volume, and Yellin
2002. On the role of social distance, see, among others, the experimental results of Elisabeth
Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, and Vernon Smith (1996). We thank HOPE’s reader for drawing our
attention to the possible role of benevolence in government in Hume.
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“it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in politics,
which is false in fact. But to satisfy us on this head, we may consider,
that men are generally more honest in their private than in their public
capacity, and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than when their
own private interest is alone concerned.” Thus the way in which knav-
ery rears its ugly head is not invariant to institutions. Why might the
prevalence of knavery systematically differ in private and public choice
contexts? Hume’s argument rests on the insight that approbational incen-
tives systematically differ in politics and everyday life.
Hume’s argument, couched in modern economic language, is more
or less the following: a knave (whether engaging in public or private
choice) maximizes his utility subject to his constraints. His utility de-
pends on both material income and good reputation. In a private choice
context (an exchange) his constraint is transparency, meaning a nonnoisy
signal of one’s behavior. Transparency ensures that one’s cheated trading
partner knows ex post by whom he was cheated (see Levy 1992), though
income increases if one cheats. One’s defection in any simple PD situ-
ation will generate material income, but at the cost of a loss of reputa-
tional utility, and perhaps, in a repeated game, potential future income.
Hume ([1742] 1985a, 43) notes that, indeed, “honour is a great check
upon mankind.”
In any large numbers–type situation, however, the tight connection
between personal cheating and reputation may weaken. Where opacity
rather than transparency prevails (where any signal of individual cheat-
ing is noisy), “this check is, in a great measure, removed” (43).6 Thus
Hume argues that “men are generally more honest in their private than
in their public capacity” (43). In the public choice context Hume envis-
ages, reputational utility accrues to the individual as a member of a group
(party or faction) rather than as an individual per se. Group reputation is
thus akin to a public good and suffers from a public good–type problem.
Free riding will occur as the reputational costs otherwise fully borne by
an individual who cheats are largely externalized onto others. Therefore
one’s own loss of reputational utility is subject to a 1/n-type problem:
with large numbers, defection generates reputational externalities—all
6. Madison’s discussion of “respect for character” as an inadequate check against faction
draws heavily on Hume: “However strong this motive may be in individuals, it is considered
as very insufficient to restrain them from injustice. In a multitude its efficacy is diminished in
proportion to the number which is to share the praise or blame” (emphasis added; see Adair
[1974] 1998, 145). On Hume and Madison, see Adair [1974] 1998, 132–51. The possible links
with the federalist literature is an important potential future development of the present essay.
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members of one’s own party or faction suffer the loss of a fraction of their
own reputational utility when any single member cheats—thus every in-
dividual (only bearing a 1/n share of any subsequent reputational loss)
has the incentive to cheat. Hume argues, indeed, that where self-interest
prevails wholly unchecked by rules or where its workings are actively
encouraged by poor-quality rules, as where any large numbers–induced
opacity prevails, “the whole senate . . . [will act] . . . as if it contained
not one member, who had any regard to public interest and liberty” (43).
Hume concludes that where the rules of the game are inadequately
aligned with self-interest, they guarantee suboptimality: where “sepa-
rate interest be not checked . . . we ought to look for nothing but faction,
disorder, and tyranny from such a government. In this opinion I am jus-
tified by experience, as well as by the authority of all philosophers and
politicians, both antient and modern” (43).
Hume proposes a surprising but viable solution to the weakening of
the constraints caused by large-group situations: a mixed government
similar to the British system. This mixed government differs from the
ancient conceptions of mixed government proposed by figures like Ci-
cero or Tacitus because here “one rank [house of commons], whenever
it pleased, might swallow up all the rest, and engross the whole power
of the constitution. . . . For so great is the natural ambition of men, that
they are never satisfied with power; and if one order of men, by pursu-
ing its own interest, can usurp upon every other order, it will certainly
do so, and render itself, as far as possible, absolute and uncontroulable”
(43–44). And this odd form of mixed government works, for Hume, by a
logic similar to that at play in any large numbers PD situation: individual
knavery checks collective knavery. Just as it is human nature (knavery)
that generates the original problem, so it is human nature (knavery) that
provides the solution.7
Hume’s theory of constitutional equilibrium makes use of the tension
between individual and collective self-interest. No single institutional
power alone will prevail because the institutional powers are “balanced”
against each other. The knavery of one institution will hit the wall of
the knavery of another institution. Tyranny will not emerge, and indi-
vidual liberty can therefore prevail. Similarly, within each institutional
7. Hume ([1742] 1985a, 44–45) asks “by what means is this member of our constitution
[house of commons] confined within the proper limits; since from our very constitution, it
must necessarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itself? How
is this consistent with our experience of human nature?”
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power, competing knaveries play a self-checking role. We would expect
that politicians would realize the benefits of collusion. By colluding they
may generate enough power to prevail against a competing institutional
power. But knavery weakens collusion (see Cowen and Sutter 1999).
Thus one PD game helps trump another. The self-interest of any sin-
gle parliamentarian helps check the self-interestedness of Parliament as
a whole. Though the self-interest of Parliament viewed as a collective
body or unitary entity lies in engrossing all power (and concomitantly,
all available surplus or rents) to itself, the self-interest of any single par-
liamentarian lies in defecting: voting against Parliament in support of the
Crown for a suitable reward. Self-interested knavery, defection, or what
Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter (1999) term “cooperative inefficacy,” is
the very glue that ensures that the “antient constitution” sticks. Hume
([1751] 1985, 45) argues therefore that corruption has a beneficial albeit
unintended consequence: “Some degree and kind of it are inseparable
from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preserva-
tion of our mixed government.” We can read Hume as suggesting that po-
litical knavery (cooperative inefficacy) has second-best efficiency prop-
erties.8
2. “Politics without Romance”?
The Buchanan-Musgrave Debate
The Buchanan-Musgrave debate centers on whether to follow Hume,
when Hume claims that public choosers ought to be modeled as pur-
suing their private interests.
James M. Buchanan characterizes public choice as the study of poli-
tics without romance (see, e.g., Buchanan 1979, 211) by endorsing
8. Hume’s worst-case essay had an immense influence on James Mill’s ([1820] 1978) slave-
driver model of government. Mill utterly rejects Hume’s pregnant theory of constitutional equi-
librium on worst-case grounds. Mill simply treats it as axiomatic that any single party (Crown,
Lords, or Commons) will ultimately enjoy supremacy—subjugating the other two parties to the
constitutional settlement. The unitary polity thus extracts all surplus above subsistence from the
hapless populace. Where self-interest (political knavery) short-circuits the logic of cooperative
efficacy, however, the populace retain a greater than subsistence share of the social surplus.
T. B. Macaulay’s famous attack on Mill’s worst-case theorizing argues, just like Hume, that it
is the very self-interest of the relevant parties that makes the British constitution stick. Any sin-
gle party is willing to defect from any agreement made with another party to cooperate toward
the end of weakening the power (and ultimately subjugating) the remaining party. Macaulay ar-
gues that any such agreement is highly unstable in the face of incentives to cheat. Paley ([1785]
2002, 339–40) similarly argues that any collusion between parties to the constitutional settle-
ment is highly unstable in the presence of incentives to defect.
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Hume’s view that all people are to be presumed knaves in politics. Rich-
ard Musgrave, on the other hand, openly rejects Hume’s views when
he claims, “I do not join Hume’s proposition that in viewing govern-
ment ‘everyone ought to be considered a knave.’ . . . I would rather draw
on people’s capacity to serve as responsible members of the commu-
nity, so that government may do its important tasks and do them well”
(Buchanan and Musgrave 2001, 82).
The debate may be summed up by Buchanan himself:
Sometime after The Power to Tax was published . . . Richard Mus-
grave and I were at a conference somewhere, and I raised this ques-
tion: Don’t you feel that under certain circumstances, you would want
to constrain the government? And I said, for example, suppose you
had a tiger, a pet tiger. Wouldn’t you want to have a muzzle on that
pet tiger in case that he might bite somebody? So you put him on a
muzzle. And Richard Musgrave said, oh I wouldn’t want to do that
because I might want the tiger to eat the grass.9 (Buchanan and Mus-
grave 2001, 89)
Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan’s Power to Tax ([1980] 2000)
is a classic in worst-case political economy, modeling government as a
revenue-hungry Leviathan.10 Brennan and Buchanan suggest that con-
stitutional rules will constrain Leviathan’s taxing proclivities, placing
a constitutional “muzzle” on government’s discretionary power. Buch-
anan’s position could not perhaps appear any further removed from that
of Musgrave. Indeed, Buchanan suggests that “politically, there is a dra-
matic difference between the way we [Buchanan and Musgrave] im-
plicitly model what politics can do” (Buchanan and Musgrave 2001,
251).
David M. Levy (2002) argues that Buchanan’s worst-case philosophy
of constitutional political economy is similar to J. W. Tukey’s worst-
case philosophy of mathematical statistics: they both focus on worst-
case thinking rather than best-case thinking, and they both look at how to
9. “Important contributions have been made by public-choice analysis. But too much of its
work—especially in the United States—has been in the Hobbesian image of Leviathan with
an ever-growing and abusive government. Such need not be the case. . . . bureaucrats (why not
civil servants?) may be public-spirited as well as selfish, and political leadership may be con-
structive as well as destructive” (Musgrave 1997, 156).
10. See also, among others, Forbes and Zampelli 1989, Ross 1983, Shapiro and Sonstelie
1982, and Oates 1985.
80 Andrew Farrant and Maria Pia Paganelli





Figure 1 Fragile and robust political economy
avoid disasters rather than at how to achieve the best theoretical (even if
not necessarily feasible) outcome. “The use of heavy-tailed distributions
as paradigm—without worrying overly much about descriptive accuracy
as well as the ‘unrealistic’ use of Leviathan models—are defended by
the desire to avoid disaster” (Levy 2002, 131; emphasis added).11
Levy translates “worst-case” thinking in political economy (especially
worst-case theorizing about government) into the “lingua franca of ro-
bust statistics” (131). Figure 1 maps the performance of two institu-
tional frameworks (sets of “rules of the game,” to invoke a favored public
choice term) as a function of the putative state of the world, for example,
one’s assumptions with regard to agent-type.
Let us suppose that the state of the world is that represented by γ .
Where γ represents the state of the world (or supposition of the model),
institution 1 generates a greater amount of the metric “good stuff”
11. See, for example, Brennan and Buchanan [1985] 2000, 35, 62–63.
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(Levy’s terminology) than does institution 2. If γ holds, then 1 outper-
forms 2 in terms of generating our desirable metric “good stuff.”
Levy’s analytical machinery allows insights into the (Hume)-Buch-
anan-Musgrave debate. Institution 1 represents Musgrave’s position—
roughly akin to what Buchanan calls “benevolent despot” public finance
theory (see, e.g., Buchanan 1987, 56, 303). Institution 1 may represent
Hume’s absolute monarchy as well. Institution 2 represents Buchanan’s
worst-case philosophy of constitutional political economy, as well as
Hume’s “antient constitution.” Supposition γ represents the “benevolent
despot” assumption—the assumption that some individuals (particularly
those in government) are not knaves.
Levy (2002, 131) notes that “von Neumann’s minimax loss approach
to decision making is absolutely central to robust [worst-case] think-
ing.” The maximax approach to decision making, however, is utterly
central to best-case thinking about government, leading us to favor 1
over 2: The possible failure of γ does not impact on the choice between
1 and 2. Indeed, traditional public finance theory (1 in the graph) is su-
perior to “public choice” (2 in the graph) where the envisaged “despot”
is wholly public-spirited (where γ holds). Similarly, for Hume “abso-
lute monarchy” (1) is superior to “mixed government” (2) where the
monarch is wholly public-spirited. Weaken the supposition of public-
spiritedness (γ ), however, thereby modeling the monarch as more akin
to Hume’s “knave,” or the government as more “despot” than “benevo-
lent,” and deadweight losses are utterly pervasive, or, in Hume’s frame-
work, tyranny inevitably results.
Worst-case thinking (minimax), however, necessitates that we take
the possible failure of γ rather more seriously. Robust institutions (2)
are designed to place a bound on the loss of “good stuff” that results on
supposition γ ’s failure (Levy 2002, 134). And therein, or so we argue,
lies a problem.
3. Robust Institutions:
Romance by the Backdoor?
Gordon Tullock (1987, 87) identifies a problem in constitutional politi-
cal economy: “The view that the government can be bound by specific
provisions [constitutional rules] is naïve. Something must enforce those
rules, and whatever enforces them is itself unbounded.” Is the constitu-
tional political economist à la Buchanan ultimately something of a
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best-case thinker? Does constitutional political economy allow romance
back into the analysis?12
We suggest that Buchanan and Musgrave are both best-case thinkers
of a sort. Hume is a consistent worst-case thinker. Buchanan differs from
Musgrave simply as to at which stage of the analysis he allows best-case
theorizing to enter the picture. Musgrave (1997, 156) allows best-case
thinking to enter the analysis center stage when suggesting that gov-
ernment intervene to rectify market failures. Buchanan allows best-case
thinking to rear its head at the constitutional stage—implicitly suggest-
ing that angel-designed and -enforced constitutional rules mitigate gov-
ernment failure. This is not to say that best-case thinking per se is to be
avoided at all times, but simply that political economists ought to read-
ily admit to themselves that best-case thinking is perhaps inescapable
within their models.
In terms of figure 1, we suggest that constitutional political econ-
omy implicitly makes something akin to a maximax (best-case) assump-
tion when drawing institution 2. Constitutional political economy read-
ily limits the supposition of γ (public-spiritedness) to one point for insti-
tution 1 (e.g., government discretion) while making a tacit supposition
that γ (or some very close approximation to γ ) holds true at all points
when drawing institution 2 (e.g., constitutional constraints).
Levy’s analogy between constitutional political economy and robust
statistics allows us to pinpoint the difference between robust estimators
and robust institutions. The robustness of any estimator, while contin-
gent in a certain sense—namely, the presence or absence of certain tech-
nical conditions—is a noncontingent feature of statistical reality. Rules
of the game, however, may be contingent. The properties of estimators
are simply what they are irrespective of human wishes or desires that
they prove otherwise (Levy 2002, 132). The robustness (or otherwise)
of sets of rules of the game, are, by contrast, not simply akin to a datum
to which agents passively adjust. Yet it is in precisely just such a fashion
that we suggest worst-case political economy views sets of rules of the
game: constitutional political economy appears to presuppose that con-
stitutional rules are akin to a kind of noncontingently robust “enforce-
ment technology.” Brennan and Buchanan’s ([1980] 2000, 240) remark
that “we need not predict that each child will fall off the cliff to justify
12. On the presence of romance or knavery in politics, see, among others, Frey 1997 and
Brennan and Hamlin 2000.
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the installation of railings” (emphasis added) is especially apposite. The
noncontingent rules analogy is further illustrated as follows:
“It is costly to build a fence or to purchase a chain. It is possible to
prove that the no-fence, no-chain solution is more efficient than ei-
ther, provided that we model the behavior of our dog in such a way
that respects the boundaries of our property” [γ ]. . . . [Is the example]
really very different from that procedure which argues that tax struc-
ture X is more “efficient” than tax structure Y provided that we model
the behavior of government in such a way that it seeks only to further
efficiency in revenue collection? (225; emphasis added)
Railings, fence, and chain, however, just like Buchanan’s “tiger muz-
zle” (Buchanan and Musgrave 2001, 89) are all examples of a purely
noncontingently robust “enforcement technology.” All are physical tech-
nologies, which, once actually put in place, do provide a highly effective
constraint against whatever particular undesirable behavior it is that we
wish to reduce or otherwise eliminate. The rules of the game are, as such,
wholly binding: agent-type (γ or otherwise) is irrelevant.13 The “robust-
ness” of any constitutional constraints, however, is utterly predicated on
their design and enforcement by human agents.14 We suggest that as in-
terpreted from figure 1, institution 2 involves the acceptance of some
γ -type supposition about constitutional design and enforcement. It pre-
sumably ill suits the constitutional political economist (of all people)
to invoke a supposition of public-spiritedness (γ ) regarding the agent
ultimately charged with the task of designing and enforcing the consti-
tutional rules of the game. Without such an assumption, however, we
suggest that it is unclear—at least in terms of Levy’s “insurance”
metaphor—why the constitutional “insurance” will actually pay off
when “worst-case” disasters threaten.15 We suggest that constitutional
13. Constitutional political economy emphasizes “setting up rules or constraints within
which politicians must operate, rules that will make it a relatively trivial matter as to the per-
sonal characteristics of those who happen to be selected as governors” (Buchanan [1981]
2001, 47; emphasis added).
14. “There is . . . one crucial assumption which clearly underlies the whole constitutional
construction—that of enforceability” (Brennan and Buchanan [1980] 2000, 13; emphasis
added). “Faith in rules [cannot] replace the exercise of responsible policy choice” (Musgrave
1997, 159).
15. Levy (2002, 131) argues that constitutional rules provide “insurance” against the po-
tential “worst-case” disaster (loss of “good stuff”) that results when supposition γ fails. Con-
stitutional norms may “prove acceptable as embodying a minimax strategy aimed at securing
protection against the worst-case outcomes that might emerge” (Brennan and Buchanan [1985]
2000, xxiii).
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economics—like Musgrave’s advocacy of governmental intervention—
has at its very foundation a best-case supposition.
Buchanan has overtly sought to distance his own worst-case constitu-
tional political economy from the implicit best-case theorizing pervasive
in others’ writings, such as in libertarian anarchist writings (e.g., Roth-
bard 1996): “My practical society . . . moves one stage down from the
ideal [anarchy] and is based on the presumption that individuals could
not attain the behavioral standards required for such an anarchy to func-
tion” (Buchanan 1977, 11; emphasis added). In recognition of this
“frailty in human nature,” individuals agree to “enact laws, and to pro-
vide means” for their enforcement (11). Buchanan’s apparent prima facie
insistence that the rules of the game adequately substitute for agent-type
is illuminated by his analysis of a “Two-Stage Utopia” (11–12). “Stage
1” order (anarchy) is only feasible if we envisage an appropriate “mod-
ification of human nature” (12). On this point, Buchanan agrees with
Hume ([1752] 1985a, 514) that the “plainly imaginary” nature of any
plan of government necessitating “great reformation in the manners of
mankind” is particularly applicable to the case of libertarian anarchy.
The attainment of “Stage 2” order, namely, that represented by consti-
tutionally constrained government, however, only requires a change in
the rules of the game (institutions of governance) rather than any re-
making of agent-type. Thus rules apparently substitute for agent-type
(e.g., Buchanan [1981] 2001, 47). But the original problem, however,
reappears: how can we assure that the constitutional rules are the “right”
ones? And how do we assure that the “right” rules will be enforced?
Buchanan is aware that agent-type might prevent any change in the
rules of the game from sticking ex post. Where the populace are clearly
“incapable of adopting the requisite set of constitutional attitudes,” they
are “incapable of evaluating their long-term interests” (Buchanan 1977,
12–13). The public is thus unwilling to engage in nonconvex optimiza-
tion, unwilling to exchange their current rents (thus reducing their cur-
rent utility) in return for a higher payoff at a future date (Levy 1992).16
16. Elsewhere, Buchanan ([1981] 2001, 42) argues for the necessity of a “widespread adop-
tion of a ‘constitutional attitude,’ a proclivity or tendency to examine issues from a constitu-
tional perspective, as opposed to the pragmatic, short-run, utilitarian perspective that seems to
characterize . . . day-to-day political discussion and action.” How, though, does constitutional
political economy propose to mitigate the PD-type logic intrinsic to large-numbers politics?
A simple example is illustrative. Envisage politics as a simple 2 × 2 matrix. The lure of the
off-diagonal (Buchanan’s term) is pervasive. The situational logic intrinsic to the matrix as
drawn (namely, row and column dominance) suffices to generate suboptimality (envisage the
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At this juncture, Buchanan (1977, 14) cedes that anarchist and consti-
tutional political economist alike face the same dilemma. Brennan and
Buchanan ([1985] 2000, 166) are refreshingly candid in admitting to
their hope that something akin to a “new civic religion” will emerge, one
placing great emphasis on the “skepticism of the eighteenth century con-
cerning politics and government.” The hope for a new “civic religion,”
however, belies Buchanan’s ([1981] 2001, 46) remark that constitutional
political economy displays little “or no concern with replacing ‘bad,’
‘evil,’ or ‘incompetent’ politicians with others who may be ‘good.’”17
Even if Buchanan works with the presumption of universal knavery at
the postconstitutional level (everyday politics), he seems to reintroduce
best-case thinking and its “angelic” or public-spiritedness assumptions
at the preconstitutional and constitutional level, to generate the solution
to government failure.
Moreover, what assurance do we have that the rule designers will not
provide constitutional rules that will enhance their personal interests at
the expense of societal well-being? Buchanan seems unable to avoid re-
lying on the angelic nature of the constitutional writers.
loss of potential value as rent-seeking waste). Buchanan suggests that a constitutional “gener-
ality norm” be implemented, thereby eliminating the lure of the off-diagonal and restricting the
potential outcomes to cell 1 or cell 4. Thus suboptimality (cell 4) is eliminated. Unfortunately,
however, little attention is paid to why any such norm is binding ex post. The rules are envis-
aged as akin to a physical constraint or they are more akin to a potential constraint—any such
potentiality only being realized when the rule is actually enforced. Enforcement, however, is
subject to precisely the same situational logic as the original predicament for which such en-
forcement is thought to provide a potential solution. Enforcement is a public good—society
is made better off when cells 2 and 3 are simply not available options (even though if chosen
they are never actually realized). Public goods are classic nonconvexities. Thus enforcement
is privately costly—one is made worse off at least initially. Why suffer any short-term “pain”
for long-term “gain”? Constitutional political economy, while prima facie appearing a polit-
ical economy decrying any reliance on preaching as a means of social salvation, appears to
ultimately have no recourse to any alternative other than preaching: namely, attempting to in-
culcate what Buchanan elsewhere refers to as a “constitutional attitude.”
17. “Formal constraints on behavior, as laid down in legal and constitutional structures, can
never alone be sufficient to insure viability in social order. An underlying set of ethical norms
or standards seems essential, although we recognize that formal and informal constraints be-
come substitutes at some margins of adjustment” (Buchanan and Musgrave 2001, 25). “Per-
haps more important than formal constitutional changes are changes in ethical attitudes that
would make attempted reforms workable” (Buchanan [1996] 2001, 275; emphasis added).
Elsewhere, Buchanan intriguingly remarks that economists neglect “the ‘constitution of pri-
vate man,’ which roughly translates as ‘character,’ as well as the ‘constitution of public men,’
which translates into the necessary underpinning of a free society, the ‘character’ of society, if
you will” (1979, 102).
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Constitutional political economy makes creative use of Rawlsian-type
“veil of ignorance” arguments. No good explanation is provided, how-
ever, as to why the rules chosen behind any such veil are binding ex
post. Moreover, a knave has no incentive to go behind any veil (real or
imagined). Using the Buchanan-Musgrave metaphor of tiger and muz-
zle, why would any knave volunteer to muzzle his or her own self-
interest? Only angels would sacrifice themselves for the well-being of
others.
Hume, on the other hand, offered a solution that consistently assumes
knavery at all levels. Hume does not need to rely on angels writing the
British constitutional rules, as the “antient constitution” was not written
by anybody. The “antient constitution” emerged from centuries of com-
promise, bargaining, and negotiations between rival parties and political
bodies, which is to say, the constitution seemed to have emerged from
centuries of clashing knavery.
Hume, therefore, avoids Buchanan’s problem at its root. The British
system works, and works rather well, according to Hume, because it
does not rely at any level on angelic behavior. The constitutional rules
allow knavery to check knavery by maintaining a multiplicity of compet-
ing self-interested parties both at the enforcement level and, especially,
at the rule-writing stage. Having only one person writing the constitu-
tion would be a disaster. The knavery of the constitutional writer would
be unchecked by other knavery, thereby resulting in tyranny.
If any single person acquire power enough to take our constitution to
pieces, and put it up a-new, he is really an absolute monarch; and we
have already had an instance of this kind [Oliver Cromwell], suffi-
cient to convince us, that such a person will never resign his power, or
establish any free government. (Hume [1742] 1985d, 52)
Knavery offers enough incentives to have constitutional rules that allow
for knavery to check knavery. In fact, the British constitution does not
have any single individual or body as its author. It is the unintended result
of centuries of experience with self-interested behaviors. William Paley
([1785] 2002, 328) describes how the
constitution of England, like that of most countries of Europe, hath
grown out of occasion and emergency; from the fluctuating policy of
different ages; from the contentions, successes, interests, and oppor-
tunities, of different orders and parties of men in the community. It
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resembles one of those old mansions, which, instead of being built all
at once, after a regular plan, and according to the rules of architecture
at present established, has been reared in different ages of the art, has
been altered from time to time, and has been continually receiving ad-
ditions and repairs suited to the taste, fortune, or conveniency, of its
successive proprietors.
It is exactly this patchwork product of chance, rather than the wisdom
of one or a few public-spirited angel-like individuals, that, for Hume,
generates rules robust enough to keep decentralized and competing self-
interests in check. Rules formed by the experience of knavery playing
against knavery, rather than by the experience of one knave or a few
colluding ones, are more robust examples of worst-case thinking because
they are better able to cope and to learn how to prevent the knavery of
one group from prevailing. Relying on one constitutional author implies
that his knavery would go unchecked. On the other hand, if the players
are many, there is a multiplication of knavery that would prevent any
single knavery from wholly prevailing.18
For Hume, assuming angels write constitutional rules is just as much
a mistake as assuming that angels would enforce a perfect constitution
and rule a country. Knavery is for Hume the most efficacious check on
knavery, given human nature. And the rules that allow knavery to play
against knavery must be generated by the same unintentional and “acci-
dental” process of competing knavery rather than by a self-proclaimed
public-spirited mind.19
For Hume, therefore, knavery offers enough incentives to write, en-
force, and maintain the rules. This of course does not imply that the
checks which knavery provides against knavery are going to work ev-
ery single time (as the Cromwell episode teaches), but that such checks
as exist are the best we have available, given that attempting to remake
man is not feasible.
18. For an exposition of the role of decentralization in forming robust rules, see Paganelli
2005.
19. “By a balance of power is meant, that there is no power possessed by one part of the
legislature, the abuse or excess of which is not checked by some antagonist power, residing
in another part” (Paley [1785] 2002, 337). Where “power is distributed among several courts,
and several orders of men, we should always consider the separate interest of each court, and
each order; and if we find that, by the skilful division of power, this interest must necessarily,
in its operation, concur with public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy”
(Hume [1742] 1985a, 43).
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Conclusion
Buchanan argues that Musgrave’s favored institutional structure is highly
nonrobust in the presence of nonangelic public choosers. Buchanan’s
model, however, while providing a relatively robust institutional struc-
ture for private choosers, appears to leave humanity in the hand of blind
hope in the public-choosing sphere. Hume, by contrast, while thinking
consistently in terms of the worst-case (universal knavery in politics)
offers a second-best solution. In Hume’s view, because of the reciprocal
check—or mutual antagonism—that multiple knavish agents provide on
one another, two knaves are better than one.
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